SPLM-M Vision & History

The vision of the SPLM is therefore that of the New Sudan. This vision is consistent with how nations are formed. The Sudan is no exception. In the Sudan people have moved in time and space and have become part of the Sudanese nation, and the character and identity of this nation must be based on its reality, on its historical and contemporary diversity, not on misconceptions or distorted designs of anybody who grabs power in Khartoum.

The Rise and Evolution of the SPLM

The SPLM Origins

  1. I.1 The formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is a continuation of the past struggles of the Sudanese people, before, during and after colonialism. The rise of the SPLM/A in 1983 was a translation and a continuation of the longstanding political discontent into an armed conflict. The resort of the SPLM/A to armed struggle was informed by the earlier armed struggles against repression, and represented a continuation of them after they had been temporarily halted by colonialism and later by the Addis Ababa Agreement, which stopped the civil war in southern Sudan for a short while (1972-1983).

    1.2 Resistance has been the natural reaction of the oppressed and marginalized peoples of the Sudan against the various Khartoum-based governments. The resistance took different forms according to the prevailing circumstances. In the cities and urban centers it took the form of popular uprisings (1964 and 1985), while in the marginalized areas, especially of Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile, the resistance took the form of popular and patriotic armed struggle (1955-1973 and 1983-2005). The birth and formation of the SPLM/A in 1983 was, therefore, not an isolated incident, but rather a culmination and continuation of these struggles of the Sudanese people.

    The SPLM: Departure from the Thinking Paradigm of “Old Sudan”

  2. It dawned on the SPLM leadership that marginalization in all its forms, discrimination, injustice and subordination, constitute the root causes of the conflict that cannot be addressed in a piecemeal fashion through dishing out handouts and concessions to the disgruntled and rebellious groups whenever a conflict erupted in a particular region. Sudanese have problems everywhere in the west, in the east, in the center, and even in the far north. The later outbreak of the armed conflicts and wars in eastern and western Sudan has vindicated the correctness and farsightedness of this analysis and vision. Defining the problem as the “southern problem” is in itself an attempt at marginalizing southerners. It is not the “problem of the South”, as conventionally advocated by the successive ruling regimes in Khartoum, but rather the “problem of the Sudan”, particularized in the South. In contradistinction from the previous secessionist movements, the SPLM advocated the liberation of the whole Sudan and not only south Sudan.

    SPLM: Overcoming Challenges and Contradictions of the Struggle

  3. The SPLM’s grand objective of bringing about radical and fundamental change in the Sudan as a whole was not a dream, but an objective that was premised on the victories and setbacks of the Sudanese people and on the correct and visionary definition of the central problem of the Sudan. Since its inception, the SPLM critically and objectively analyzed the Sudanese reality and concluded that we must struggle for a new type of Sudan to which we all belong; a united Sudan, albeit on new bases; a new Sudan political dispensation that is anchored in and based on the realities of the Sudan, on both our historical and contemporary diversities. We call this new political dispensation the New Sudan, as opposed to the Old Sudan, which has cost us 42 years of war since independence.

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Articulation of the Vision

  • The vision of the SPLM is therefore that of the New Sudan. This vision is consistent with how nations are formed. The Sudan is no exception. In the Sudan people have moved in time and space and have become part of the Sudanese nation, and the character and identity of this nation must be based on its reality, on its historical and contemporary diversity, not on misconceptions or distorted designs of anybody who grabs power in Khartoum.

  • Without a sincere appreciation of these realities, phrases like 'nation building' and 'national unity' become empty slogans. Indeed, the concept and reality of the state or nation-state becomes fractured and degenerates into a mechanism for enabling some of the most notorious and unprincipled members of the local elite and power seekers, masquerading as nationalists, to seize and retain political power, and then proceed to pillage and render the people of their so-called nation-state destitute.

  • Voluntary unity in the New Sudan is, therefore, conditioned on creating a political and socio-economic commonality that brings all the Sudanese together as equal citizens in rights and obligations. We must clearly move away from the parameters of the Old Sudan of racism, religious intolerance, historical myopia, and the associated economic collapse, instability and wars. The Old Sudan has clearly taken us to a dead end, to the edge of the abyss.

  • There are two, and only two, choices: either the country breaks up into several independent states, or we agree to establish the New Sudan, a new Sudanese socio-political entity to which we pledge our undivided loyalty and allegiance irrespective of race, tribe, religion, or gender; a new Sudanese commonality that seeks to include rather than exclude; a new Sudanese political dispensation that provides equal opportunities for every Sudanese to develop and realize his or her potential; a Sudan where there is justice and equality of opportunity for all; a democratic Sudan in which governance is based on popular will and the rule of law; a New Sudan where religion and state are constitutionally separated; a New Sudan in which oppression and hegemony by any particular ethnic group are banished; a Sudan in which all the institutions of social, cultural and racial hegemony and discrimination are dismantled; a Sudan in which there is respect for universal human rights.

  • The New Sudan is not the antithesis of the Old Sudan nor does the vision imply the complete destruction of the Old Sudan and building the New Sudan on its ashes. The construction of the New Sudan is, rather, a “transformative” process for fundamental sociowww.theirwords.org 15 economic change and political restructuring that would build on all the positive elements of the Old Sudan, informed by all our historical and contemporary experiences and cognizant of, and equipped for, the enormous challenges of the 21st century. It is the responsibility of the SPLM and other forces of change, particularly in the North, to utilize the most refined and positive components of their respective experiences in their effort to lead the transformation process into the New Sudan.

  • The national crisis that has been afflicting the Sudan since independence is essentially a crisis of leadership reflected in the social nature of the successive ruling elites, namely; their narrow social base, constricted intellectual outlook, backward political values, poor imagination, isolation from the people, and disdain of the humanist ideals. Thus, these elites have failed in developing the country and resorted to express their parochial interests by adopting divisive policies and using state power in promoting and defending Arabism and Islam, which resulted in a crisis of identity and exacerbated the crisis of nation-building. This crisis of identity is manifested in the inability of the Sudanese to reconcile themselves with the cultural and ethnic realities that make of them a nation.

  • The vision of the New Sudan, thus, is essentially a national framework, a socio-economic and political commonality, anchored in and accommodative of the country’s multiple diversities. The essence of the vision is the equitable management of diversity and respect for the identities and cultures of all “national” groups. Though the Sudan constitutes the base and focus of the vision, the context could apply globally to countries and regions torn apart by racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and disparity. As is the case in Africa, the majority of the continent’s “nation states” are mosaics of multifarious nationalities and cultures. The unity of those states hinges on the recognition of, and respect for, their multiple diversities and presupposes pulling together the common strands that unite while eschewing factors that divide.

Normative Framework of the Vision

  • The crisis does not lie in the mere definition of the Sudanese identity, but rather in the implications of the distorted self-perception of the ruling elites in the center, in terms of participation in the shaping and sharing of power, access to wealth, resources, services, employment and development opportunities.

  • Corrective measures are therefore required to promote an inclusive sense of belonging on the part of all Sudanese as citizens who enjoy all the rights of citizenship on equal footing.

  • While identities cannot be legislated and radically transformed overnight, a constitutional and legal framework of equality can be enshrined with immediate effect and could, over time, allow an inclusive national identity to evolve.

  • The normative framework of the stipulated New Sudan emanates from the correction of the ills of the Old Sudan as outlined above. It presupposes a united, democratic and secular Sudan, a constitutionally, economically and culturally reconstructed Sudan. The founding notions of the Vision for the polity, society, culture and economy of the New Sudan are:

    • Evolving a Sudanese Identity reflective of the Sudan’s multi-ethnic and multicultural character.

    • Building unity of the country on the totality of the components that make up Sudan’s historical and contemporary diversities, and separating religion from the state.  Restructuring of power in the center and decentralization of power by redefining the relationship between Khartoum and the regions and devolving more powers to the regions.

    • Fostering democratic governance in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are not mere slogans but concrete realities.

    • Promoting environmentally and even sustainable development.